El Faro’s submerged stern. The cargo ship sank in 2015 after sailing into a Category 3 hurricane, killing the 33 crew members aboard. Image: NTSB.
When contemplating technology in the maritime context, the mind often gravitates towards sophisticated electronic tools like GPS, AIS and ECDIS. However, it is essential to broaden our perspective.
Technology – defined as “the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes” –encompasses not only the technical skills associated with electronic tools, but also the soft (or human) skills crucial for human interaction and decision-making.
The tragic loss of the El Faro and her crew serves as a somber reminder that the intricate balance required between advanced technology and human expertise is a critical determinant of safety and success.
(El Faro and her crew were lost at sea on Oct. 1, 2015 after sailing into the eye of a hurricane near the Bahamas.)
This article delves into the aftermath of this maritime disaster, the extensive investigations conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the U.S. Coast Guard, and the crucial lessons learned that have resonated across the maritime community.
The Tragedy and Resulting Recommendations
The sinking of El Faro, a cargo ship with 33 souls aboard, stands as a monumental tragedy within the maritime domain. Unlike routine incidents of collisions, fires or fatalities, this event carried a deeply personal resonance for many in the U.S. maritime community.
Crew members were not just colleagues; they were friends, schoolmates and acquaintances. This tragedy, though heartbreaking, has been a catalyst for profound lessons that extend far beyond the confines of individual loss.
In investigating the El Faro sinking, the NTSB, in collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard, embarked on one of the most intricate maritime investigations in history. The Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) deemed it “one of the worst maritime disasters in U.S. history.” Over a span of more than two years, investigators delved into every aspect leading to the catastrophe.
After an exhaustive examination, the NTSB made a series of recommendations that should shape future maritime policy. Unfortunately, several of the recommendations have not seen rapid incorporation into regulatory policy.
NTSB recommendations 31, 33, 34, and 35 specifically address meteorology training for licensed deck officers at both operational and management levels.
Responding to these recommendations, institutions like the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies (MITAGS) have augmented their meteorology training programs, incorporating additional elements recommended by the NTSB.
MITAGS now offers comprehensive meteorology training for candidates seeking original 3rd mate’s licenses and those aiming for an upgrade to chief mate/master positions. Specialized courses in Heavy Weather Avoidance, tailored to specific ocean regions such as the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans, now form a critical part of the curriculum. These courses delve into tropical storm avoidance, weather analysis and routing strategies.
Regrettably, despite progress in the training of new mariners and mariners seeking to upgrade their certification, the decision by the U.S. Coast Guard not to mandate this training for mariners credentialed before 1998 is disappointing.
NTSB Recommendation 45, urging the provision of personal locator beacons (PLBs) for all personnel on vessels, remains in limbo with an “unacceptable response.” The Coast Guard’s intent to consider rulemaking on PLBs by the end of 2024 is a potentially positive development, however, the delay is troubling, especially considering the loss of lives on vessels like Scandies Rose, Emmy Rose and Seacor Power, where PLBs could have made a difference.
Recommendation 32 from the NTSB mandates recurring bridge resource management (BRM) training for all deck officers during credential renewals.
However, the maritime industry faces a considerable delay in implementing this recommendation. The prospect of varying BRM refresher training requirements for active versus inactive mariners further complicates the pursuit of a standardized approach.
A glaring disparity exists in the maritime industry’s approach to professional development compared to other sectors such as education, medicine, law and aviation. The absence of mandatory Continuing Professional Development (CPD) or Continuing Education (CE) requirements leaves mariners without a structured framework for skill updates and assessments.
This stands in stark contrast to the aviation sector’s stringent standards for check-rides and simulation assessments every 6-12 months.
In an industry where continuous learning is imperative, the lack of mandatory BRM refresher training raises concerns about “software updates” for the human mind. The deficiencies in BRM, as identified in the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, underscore the need for ongoing education in assertive communication and competency improvement.
Six years after the release of the NTSB and Coast Guard reports, the absence of requirements for BRM refresher training reflects a missed opportunity for progress.
Losing Sight of Lessons Learned
Despite the profound lessons from the El Faro tragedy, there is evidence that these lessons are slipping from the collective consciousness of the maritime community.
An informal poll indicates that less than a quarter of industry professionals are aware of the NTSB recommendations regarding El Faro’s loss. With seafarers in management roles who commenced their careers post-El Faro, there is a risk that crucial lessons may be forgotten.
This underlines the importance of sustained efforts to integrate these lessons into training programs, particularly those related to hazardous weather avoidance.
The loss of El Faro and her crew members has reverberated throughout the maritime industry, leaving an indelible mark on safety protocols and training practices. The lessons learned from this tragedy underscore the need for a holistic approach that integrates both technological advancements and ongoing education in the maritime profession.
As the industry grapples with implementing crucial recommendations, it must not lose sight of the human element that remains at the heart of safe and effective navigation. In the relentless pursuit of progress, the maritime community must strive for a future where tragedies like the El Faro serve as catalysts for enduring change rather than painful reminders of missed opportunities.
Capt. Madden is an actively-sailing mariner, currently on container ships. His experience over the past 34 years has ranged from government vessels engaged in underway replenishment to offshore tugs, coastal towing, heavy-lift ships and survey vessels. He has been an adjunct instructor at MITAGS since 2013. Courses he has been involved with range from operational to management level meteorology, hazardous weather avoidance, navigation (terrestrial, celestial and electronic), safety, bridge resource management, leadership and management and ship handling. Madden will be a panelist at the 2024 Navtech Conference, to be held Dec. 4-5, at the Renaissance Seattle Hotel www.NavigationTech.org.